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Both the ability to deceive others, and the ability to detect deception, has long been
proposed to confer an evolutionary advantage. Deception detection has been studied
extensively, and the finding that typical individuals fare little better than chance in detecting
deception is one of the more robust in the behavioral sciences. Surprisingly, little research
has examined individual differences in lie production ability. As a consequence, as far as
we are aware, no previous study has investigated whether there exists an association
between the ability to lie successfully and the ability to detect lies. Furthermore, only a
minority of studies have examined deception as it naturally occurs; in a social, interactive
setting. The present study, therefore, explored the relationship between these two
facets of deceptive behavior by employing a novel competitive interactive deception
task (DeceIT). For the first time, signal detection theory (SDT) was used to measure
performance in both the detection and production of deception. A significant relationship
was found between the deception-related abilities; those who could accurately detect a
lie were able to produce statements that others found difficult to classify as deceptive or
truthful. Furthermore, neither ability was related to measures of intelligence or emotional
ability. We, therefore, suggest the existence of an underlying deception-general ability that
varies across individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon to hear of “poachers turned gamekeepers”;
originally this referred to situations in which those who stole live-
stock from rich landowners would later become employed by the
same landowner to guard their livestock. A more modern exam-
ple relates to the case of the infamous confidence-trickster, Frank
Abagnale Jr., who is now an FBI financial fraud consultant. Those
who employ former “poachers” assume that people who are good
at breaking the law are good at detecting when others break the
law. This assumption is widespread, but at least in the case of
deception, there is no scientific evidence to suggest that good liars
are necessarily good lie detectors.
Although the existence of a “deception-general ability” (con-
ferring success in both lie production and detection) has not been
explored in the behavioral sciences, it has been suggested that skill
in both the production and detection of deception offers selective
advantages in human and non-human animals, and, therefore,
that each is subject to evolutionary pressure (Dawkins and Krebs,
1979; Bond and Robinson, 1988). Twin studies, in whichmonozy-
gotic and dizygotic twins are compared on a characteristic of
interest in order to isolate genetic and environmental contribu-
tions to that trait, provide evidence for the role of evolution in
shaping at least the propensity to deceive (with heritability val-
ues of between 0.34 and 0.63; Martin and Eysenck, 1976; Young
et al., 1980; Martin and Jardine, 1986; Rowe, 1986), if not the abil-
ity to do so successfully. Evolutionary biologists and comparative
psychologists have characterized the relationship between decep-
tion production and detection as two sides of an intra- or inter-
specific “evolutionary arms race”—improvements in the ability
to deceive in one species, or in certain members of a species,
prompt resultant improvements in deception detection among
competitors and vice versa (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979; Bond and
Robinson, 1988; Byrne, 1996). While this characterization of the
relationship between the ability to deceive and to detect deception
is intuitively appealing, it relies on there being an opportunity
for evolution to act independently on the two processes, i.e., it
assumes that the two abilities depend on different psychologi-
cal and neurological mechanisms. Interestingly, models of both
the production and detection of deception derived from cogni-
tive psychology and cognitive neuroscience do not readily support
such a distinction. They posit roles for theory of mind (the ability
to represent one’s own and another’s mental states) and executive
function processes (conflict monitoring, response inhibition) in
both deception production and deception detection (e.g., Spence
et al., 2004; Sip et al., 2008). If these models are correct, then
selection pressure favouring improvement in either production
or detection will result in concomitant improvements in the other
ability. Onemay, therefore, expect that good liars will also be good
lie detectors.
In two wide-ranging reviews of the psychological literature on
deception by Bond and DePaulo (2006, 2008) it was argued that
the over-whelmingmajority of studies show that humans are poor
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lie detectors (achieving approximately 54% lie-truth detection
accuracy), and that stable individual differences in lie detection
ability may not exist. The latter conclusion was based on a meta-
analysis demonstrating that variance in lie detection performance
across participants was not greater than that expected by chance,
and that no individual difference measure has been shown to
reliably predict lie detection performance.
While fully endorsing these conclusions based on the existing
literature, we make two observations: (1) that the claim of poor,
undifferentiated lie detection performance across participants is
only valid given the type of paradigms that have previously been
used to study deception detection ability (see DePaulo et al., 2003
for an overview of the range of deception procedures employed),
and (2) that potentially the most interesting, and theoretically rel-
evant, individual difference measure has not yet been related to
lie detection ability—the ability to deceive. This study, therefore,
aims to introduce a novel interactive paradigm to assess the ability
to produce and to detect deceptive statements, and to determine
whether these two abilities are related; that is, to discover whether
a deception-general ability exists.
Real-life deception is a dynamic interpersonal process (Buller
and Burgoon, 1996), yet less than 9% (Bond and DePaulo, 2006)
of previous deception studies have allowed for even moderate
degrees of social interaction between those attempting to produce
deceptive statements (“Senders”) and those attempting to detect
deception (“Receivers”). The potential impact of this lack of inter-
action is difficult to gauge at this point in time. Assessment of
deceptiveness on the basis of videotaped or written statements
removes all opportunity for the Receiver to engage in explic-
itly taught or intuitive questioning techniques designed to make
the task of deception detection easier. Furthermore, the num-
ber of channels through which (dis)honesty can be both detected
and conveyed may be severely limited, with concomitant effects
on the performance of both Sender and Receiver. The lack of
social interaction is not the only factor that has contributed to
the “dubious ecological validity” (O’Sullivan, 2008, 493) of pre-
vious deception research, however; further criticism centers on
the “low-stakes” (and accompanying lack of motivation/arousal)
inherent in an experimental setting (Vrij, 2000). In an attempt
to address these criticisms we introduce a novel, fully interactive,
group-based competitive deception “game” based on the False-
Opinion paradigm (Mehrabian, 1971; Frank and Ekman, 2004);
the Deceptive Interaction Task (DeceIT).
The game entails each player competing with the other mem-
bers of the group to both successfully lie, and to detect the lies of
the other players. The paradigm enables free-interaction between
participants, and, therefore, requires participants to control both
verbal and non-verbal cues when producing deceptive statements.
The competitive element of the game (with accompanying high-
value prizes) provides motivation when lying and attempting to
detect lies, and increases arousal. The motivational effect makes
the task of producing deceptive statements harder; increased
motivation has previously been reported to result in impaired
control of non-verbal deceptive cues when lying (Motivational
Impairment Effect, DePaulo and Kirkendol, 1989), and it renders
those tasked with detecting deceptionmore sceptical (Porter et al.,
2007). Increasing the difficulty of the Senders’ task is likely to
result in easier detection of deception, and thus make individual
differences in deception detection more apparent.
The second advantage to this paradigm is that both decep-
tion detection and production can be simultaneously evaluated
within participants. Curiously, little research has focussed on
individual differences relating to lie production success (Vrij
et al., 2010), despite meta-analytic results indicating substan-
tial variance in deceptive ability (Bond and DePaulo, 2008) and
prevalence studies showing that approximately 50% of lies are
told by only 5% of people (Serota et al., 2010). SDT (Green
and Swets, 1966; Meissner and Kassin, 2002) has proved useful
in characterizing deception detection performance (by providing
independent measures of both the ability to discriminate truthful
from deceptive statements, and any bias toward judging state-
ments as truthful or deceptive). Here, for the first time, we also
apply SDT to characterize deception production performance (to
separate the ease with which statements produced by the Sender
can be discriminated on the basis of their veracity, and the cred-
ibility of the Sender, i.e., how likely their statements are to be
perceived as truthful regardless of their veracity).
The deception literature provides a number of markers by
which a novel deception paradigm can be validated. For example,
deception has been shown to increase feelings of guilt, anxiety,
and cognitive load (Caso et al., 2005) and result in longer response
latencies when lying than when telling the truth (Walczyk et al.,
2003). The 54% lie-truth discrimination accuracy has also been
shown to be remarkably robust (Levine, 2010), and thus wewould
expect to see all of these effects replicated in this study. Our new
paradigm (DeceIT) allows us to determine individual differences
in the capacity for successful deception and lie detection. Of chief
theoretical interest is whether there is a deception-general abil-
ity, perhaps due to underlying individual differences in social
decoding and encoding skills (Ekman andO’Sullivan, 1991; Frank
and Ekman, 1997; Vrij et al., 2010) which would result in an
association between lie production and detection abilities.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-one healthy adults (27 female, mean age= 25.35 years, SD=
8.54) with English as a first language participated in the present
study. All participants provided informed consent to participate.
The local Research Ethics Committee (Department of Psychology,
Birkbeck College) granted ethical approval of the study.
PROCEDURE
Participants were recruited to a “Communication Skills” exper-
iment and randomly assigned to nine groups of five partici-
pants and one group of six participants, with the constraint
that groupmembers were not previously acquainted. Participants
were seated in a circle and asked to complete an “Opinion Survey”
questionnaire. The questionnaire comprised 10 opinion state-
ments (e.g., “Smoking should be banned in all public places”) to
which participants responded “agree” or “disagree.” Responses to
the Opinion Survey served as ground truth in the subsequent task
(Mehrabian, 1971; Frank and Ekman, 2004). Participants also
completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Parker et al., 2001),
a measure of the degree to which emotions can be identified
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and described in the self, and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(Davis, 1980), a measure of empathy. These instruments pro-
vide self- and other-focussed measures of emotional intelligence
(Mayer et al., 1999; Parker et al., 2001). A subset of partic-
ipants (n = 31, 61% of sample) also completed the Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999).
Participants were then informed that they were to take part in a
competitive game designed to test their communication skills and
that two £50 prizes would be awarded; one to the participant who
was rated as most credible across all trials and the other to the par-
ticipant who wasmost accurate in their judgments across all trials.
Participants were required to make both truthful and dishonest
statements relating to their answers on the Opinion Survey, with
the objective being to appear as credible as possible regardless of
whether they were telling a lie or the truth. Participants played the
role of both “Communicator” (Sender) and “Judge” (Receiver),
and their role changed randomly on a trial-by-trial basis.
On each trial, the experimenter presented one participant with
a cue card, face-down, specifying a topic from the Opinion Survey
and an instruction to lie or tell the truth. This indicated to all
participants the Sender for the trial. At a verbal instruction to
“go,” the participant turned the card, read the instruction, and
then spoke for approximately 20s, presenting either their true
or false opinion and some supporting argument. A practice trial
was conducted for all participants and the experimenter pre-
sented a verbatim example response from the piloting phase of
the study to illustrate the type of statement required (“I’m in
favour of REALITY TV, it’s got to be one of the most impor-
tant ways you can learn about the world out there and the way
people are going to behave; sometimes seeing a bad example is a
good way to shock you down the right path and make you think
about what you’re doing or going to do”). Following each trial,
Senders were required to rate whether they thought they had been
successful or unsuccessful in appearing credible. Simultaneously,
Receivers rated whether they thought the opinion given by the
Sender was true or false. Each participant completed 10 or 20
trials as Sender, half with their true opinion and half with their
false opinion. Statistical analysis demonstrated that performance
did not vary as a function of the number of statements pro-
duced and so this variable is not analysed further. The 50:50
lie-truth ratio was not highlighted to the participants at any stage
to prevent strategic responding in either the Sender or Receiver
roles. Following the task, participants were asked to rate on a
five point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”
the degree to which they experienced guilt, anxiety, and cogni-
tive load (referred to as “mental demand”) when lying and when
telling the truth. Participants were informed of the competitive
nature of the task in both the “Sender” and “Receiver” roles, were
given an overview of the trial structure (as above), but at no point
were explicit instructions given with regards to aspects of behav-
ior that should be attended to during the game, nor potential
strategies.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY
Performance in the Receiver and Sender roles was analysed using
SDT (Green and Swets, 1966) (as described in Figure 1). An
advantage of SDT is that it allows lie-truth discriminability (d′)
to be measured independently of judgment bias (C). Separate
SDT measures were calculated for the Receiver/Sender roles: the
Receiver’s capacity to discriminate lies from truths was indexed by
d′Receiver; the corresponding measure of bias, CReceiver, indicates
the tendency of a Receiver to endorse a given opinion as truthful
(credulity). The discriminability of the Sender’s truths and lies is
indexed by d′Sender. The corresponding measure of bias, CSender,
indicates the perceived credibility of a Sender’s opinions, regard-
less of their veracity. With these measures, better lie detection is
indicated by higher d′Receiver values, and increasingly successful
deception is indicated by more negative values of d′Sender.
RESULTS
PARADIGM VALIDATION
In line with previous studies (Caso et al., 2005) participants
reported greater Guilt, Anxiety, and Cognitive Load when lying
than when telling the truth (Guilt t(50) = 7.060, p < 0.001, d =
1.226, Anxiety t(50) = 9.598, p < 0.001, d = 1.784, Cognitive
Load t(50) = 9.177, p < 0.001, d = 1.421). Also in common with
previous studies (Walczyk et al., 2003), Response Latency was sig-
nificantly shorter when participants told the truth (M = 4.6 s
SD = 2.0) than when they lied (M = 6.5 s SD =3.1, t(50) =
−3.885, p < 0.001, d = 0.728). Finally, task performance in the
Receiver role was analyzed using conventional percentage accu-
racy rates and overall accuracy was found to be 54.1% (SD =
8.7%), not significantly different to the 54% reported previously
(Levine, 2010) (t(50) = 0.065, p = 0.950, d = 0.013) but signifi-
cantly greater than chance (t(50) = 3.335, p = 0.002, d = 0.667).
Fractional rates addressing accuracy for different types of state-
ment showed a significantly lower mean accuracy for truths (M =
51.1%, SD = 11.9%) than for lies (M = 57.1%, SD = 10.5%,
t(50) = −3.731, p < 0.001, d = 0.746). To compare any response
bias in the Receiver role with findings from the literature, we
calculated the number of statements of all types classified by
Receivers as truthful and found it to be 46.7% (SD = 8.8%) a
figure significantly lower than chance (t(50) = −2.667, p = 0.005,
d = 0.535).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: SDT ANALYSIS
Large individual differences were observed in all of the four
performance measures (M d′Receiver = 0.242, SD = 0.418; M
CReceiver = −0.086, SD = 0.233; M d′Sender = 0.272, SD =
0.509; M Csender = 0.097, SD = 0.256). Of principal interest
is the fact that detectability in the Sender role (d′Sender) and
the ability to discriminate in the Receiver role (d′Receiver) were
significantly correlated (r = −0.348, p = 0.006, d = 0.742, see
Figure 2). As the ability to discriminate truthful from deceptive
messages increased, the ability to produce deceptive messages
that were hard to discriminate from truthful messages increased.
Interestingly, a trend was observed for decreasing detectability in
the Sender role to be associated with a reduced response latency
difference between truthful and deceptive statements (Spearman’s
rho = 0.259, p = 0.068). The only significant association with
either measure of bias (Truth-Bias or Credibility) was a corre-
lation between the Sender’s confidence that they were believed
and their Credibility measure, i.e., those that judged they were
believed were more likely to be seen as honest independently
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FIGURE 1 | Individual difference parameters for Senders and Receivers based on signal detection theory (SDT).
FIGURE 2 | Correlation between Sender and Receiver performance
using SDT measures for Receiver Accuracy (d ′Receiver) and sender
detectability (d ′Sender) (r = −0.348, p = 0.006, d = 0.742).
of the veracity of their statements (Spearman’s rho = −0.316,
p = 0.024). Neither IQ (all r values < 0.184), emotional ability
relating to the self (all r values< 0.198), nor empathy (all r values
< 0.153) correlated with d′Receiver,CReceiver,d′Sender, or CSender.
DISCUSSION
The relationship between lie production and lie detection abili-
ties was examined using a novel group Sender/Receiver deceptive
interaction task (DeceIT) designed to address concerns over eco-
logical validity stemming from the use of tasks that do not require
social interaction and fail to generate or maintain motivation
in participants (O’Sullivan, 2008). Results indicate that the cur-
rent paradigm is comparable to previous studies with regards to
the participants’ self-reported experience of guilt, anxiety, and
cognitive load during the task, and overall lie detection accuracy.
In addition, previously reported chronometric cues to deception
(Walczyk et al., 2003) were replicated in this study, with signifi-
cantly longer response latencies when lying than when telling the
truth. Moreover, as far as we are aware, this study is the first to
provide evidence that the capacity to detect lies and the ability to
deceive others are associated. This finding suggests the existence
of a “deception-general” ability that may influence both “sides” of
deceptive interactions.
At present the “deception-general” ability described above is
little more than the association between performance on the
deception production and detection task, the root of this ability
is unknown. One can speculate that the association may be based
upon personality characteristics (for example those relating to lie
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acceptability or those affecting the degree of affective or cognitive
consequences of deception), upon learning/experience (which
may affect strategies used to detect deception and to appear less
deceptive), or on general socio-cognitive ability (e.g., Theory of
Mind) which can be called upon during deceptive interactions.
However, the data presented here merely indicate that variance
in deceptive performance is not a consequence of IQ or emo-
tional ability. It is clear that identification of the precise nature of
the proposed “deception-general” ability is an important aim for
deception research, and that further research should be devoted
to this question.
Interestingly, some evidence was observed for an associa-
tion between Sender detectability and the difference in response
latency between truthful and deceptive statements, with good
liars demonstrating smaller differences in response latency. This
suggests that, either implicitly or explicitly, Receivers were using
Response Latency in order to discriminate truthful from deceptive
statements and that good liars exhibited less of this cue. A ques-
tion for further research is the extent to which the control of
response latency is a deliberate and consistent strategy of success-
ful liars.
A significant correlation was also observed between a Sender’s
confidence that they would be believed and their credibility, but
not their discriminability. Therefore, participants could accu-
rately judge the degree to which they would appear honest irre-
spective of whether they were lying or telling the truth, but neither
their credibility, nor their confidence in appearing credible, was
related to their success in producing lies that Receivers were less
able to discriminate from truthful statements. This result bears
striking resemblance to the finding that confidence in lie detection
does not correlate with the ability to detect lies, but does correlate
with the degree to which you judge others to be credible (DePaulo
et al., 1997).
The absence of an association between IQ or emotional intel-
ligence and the ability to produce or detect lies is in need of
replication, but if supported, suggests that deceptive ability is not
simply a product of cognitive or affective ability. Such a find-
ing suggests deception-related knowledge structures that are used
both to guide one’s own behavior, and aid in the interpretation
of another’s behavior. The use of a shared representation system
for both the self and the other is common e.g., “mirror neurons”
code for one’s own and another’s action (Di Pellegrino et al.,
1992), brain regions active when emotions are experienced by the
self are active in response to the observation of another’s emo-
tion (Wicker et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004), and primary and
secondary somatosensory cortices are active upon observation
of another being touched (Blakemore et al., 2005). The use of a
shared representational system for self and other typically pro-
motes the detection of corresponding states; for example, induced
depression increases the degree to which faces are viewed as sad
(Bouhuys et al., 1995),while execution of an action enhances per-
ception of that action when executed by another (Casile and
Giese, 2006). In the current study, however, the detection of
deception in another was associated with the control of deception-
related cues in the self. Further work is needed to identify the
relationship between deceptive success, control of deceptive cues,
and the use of a shared representational system.
Despite addressing what have been described as flaws in some
of the previous research on deception, two further methodologi-
cal issues must be discussed in relation to the use of the DeceIT
paradigm, which also apply to much of the experimental work on
deception. These issues are related, and refer to the fact that in
a typical experiment the experimenter usually, (1) sanctions the
participant’s lie, and (2), instructs the participant when to lie.
Many authors have commented negatively on the use of sanc-
tioned lies in experimental studies of deception, arguing that the
use of sanctioned lies results in the liar feeling less guilt (Ekman,
1988; Vrij, 2000), less motivation to lie and, therefore, less accom-
panying arousal and cognitive effort (Feeley and de Turck, 1998),
and less “decision-making under conflict” (Sip et al., 2008). These
arguments suggest that the use of sanctioned lies in experimen-
tal studies results in a reduction in the available cues to detection.
However, empirical studies of sanctioned versus unsanctioned lies
reveal very few consistent differences between cues exhibited dur-
ing both types of lie. Feeley (1996) found that interviewers could
detect no differences in the behavior of participants telling sanc-
tioned or unsanctioned lies, while Feeley and de Turck (1998)
found that more cues to deception were associated with sanc-
tioned lies, than with unsanctioned lies. In their meta-analysis of
deception detection studies, Sporer and Schwandt (2007) iden-
tified only one deceptive cue (smiling) from the 11 studied that
differed as a result of whether the lie was sanctioned or unsanc-
tioned.
The use of sanctioned lies in experiments has also been crit-
icized due to a claimed lack of ecological validity. However,
proponents of the use of sanctioned lies in the laboratory argue
that even if levels of motivation and cognitive effort are reduced
through the use of sanctioned lies, the net effect may be to make
the deception more ecologically valid. In everyday life most lies
are unplanned, of little importance, and of no consequence if
detected (DePaulo et al., 1996; Kashy and DePaulo, 1996). In
addition, the types of sanctioned lie used in most laboratory
studies of deception (including the present study) involve false
reports about attitudes to issues or individuals, and are precisely
those most often told in everyday communication (DePaulo and
Rosenthal, 1979; Levine and McCornack, 1992; Feeley and de
Turck, 1998). These lies are often sanctioned by society when used
to, for example, bolster another’s ego (“white lies”), while more
important lies may be sanctioned by the liar’s religion, political
party, friends/family, or ideals.
Instructed lies have also been argued to lack ecological
validity—it has been suggested that rather than lying, partici-
pants are merely following the experimenter’s instructions (e.g.,
Kanwisher, 2009). As a result it has been argued that participants
should be free to choose when, and if, they lie during an exper-
iment (e.g., Sip et al., 2010). Issues regarding statistical power
and experimental control notwithstanding, we suggest that the
basic premise that instructed lies are not ecologically valid may
be flawed. For example, employees may be instructed to lie to a
client or regulator by their supervisor, children may be instructed
to lie to family members by their parents, and many people are
compelled to lie by the situation they are in (in response to finan-
cial, legal, or moral pressure). Therefore, the choice of when to
lie may not always truly exist in everyday life. Furthermore, solely
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studying non-instructed lies in an experimental setting may
induce experimental confounds relating to confidence. In an
experiment where the participant can choose whether or not to
lie, it is likely to be the case that they only tell lies that they are con-
fident are likely to be successful. Neuroimaging studies, therefore,
when attempting to elucidate neural activity differentiating lies
from truths, may instead identify neural activity differentiating
topics about which participants believe they can lie successfully
(which may be topics about which they do not hold a strong
opinion) from those that they believe they cannot lie successfully
about (potentially topics about which they do have a strong opin-
ion). Across participants, the number of lies told is also likely to
vary as a function of the participant’s belief that they are a good
liar, meaning that in any corpus of lie items the majority will
be contributed by participants who believe they are good liars.
Whether this participant sampling error will result in a distri-
bution of lies which is skewed relative to an ecologically valid
distribution of lies depends both on the degree to which indi-
viduals have control over when to lie in everyday life, and the
degree to which instructed lies are qualitatively different from lies
freely chosen. Both of these factors are presently inestimable given
current data.
The implications of the arguments pertaining to the study
of sanctioned and instructed lies in relation to the DeceIT
paradigm are unclear. Although the participant is given “permis-
sion” to lie by the experimenter, thus lies are both sanctioned
and instructed—lies are not directed toward the experimenter,
but instead to other participants who have not given their per-
mission, and, due to the competitive scenario, are disadvantaged
by the participant lying successfully. Furthermore, in the present
study, levels of cognitive effort, guilt and anxiety were all sig-
nificantly elevated during deceptive trials; indicating that the
hypothesized reduction in guilt, motivation, and cognitive effort
as a result of sanctioning lies was at least minimized using the
DeceIT paradigm.
As discussed previously, it has been argued that the abil-
ity to deceive successfully, and to detect deception, each confer
an evolutionary advantage (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979; Bond
and Robinson, 1988). Indeed, several authors argue that the
increasing utility of deception with larger social group size
has driven the increase in neocortical volume observed in
humans (Trivers, 1971; Humphrey, 1976) and other primates.
Byrne and Corp (2004) demonstrated that among modern pri-
mate species there is an association between neocortex size
and the use of tactical deception, with those species with
neocortex sizes closer to humans engaging in more tactical
deception.
These results do not necessarily imply that the ability to lie
itself is genetically determined; it is possible that deception is
a function of learning within social contexts and that different
individuals have different propensities to learn socially (Cheney
et al., 1986; Byrne, 1996). These individual differences in social
learning may come about as a result of genetically determined
differing levels of attention to conspecifics for example (Heyes,
2011). Bond et al. (1985) advance a third possibility in which indi-
viduals inherit a “demeanour bias,” which determines the degree
to which other species members are likely to judge their state-
ments as deceptive (indexed by Sender Credibility, CSender, in the
current study). They suggest that individuals with a demeanour
bias that results in a high probability of deceptive success are
likely to use deception frequently and, therefore, improve their
abilities. Conversely, those with a demeanour bias leading to
a low probability of being judged truthful, are likely to learn
quickly that deception is not a successful strategy for them and,
therefore, to use alternative strategies. The association between a
Sender’s confidence that they would be believed and their credi-
bility/demeanour bias in the present experiment lends support to
this hypothesis. It suggests that individuals track their demeanour
bias and associate it with the probability of lie success.
In summary, the present study employed an interactive
deception task designed to address ecological-validity concerns
(O’Sullivan, 2008) and allow the within-subject comparison of
deception production and detection ability. The paradigm brings
motivated Senders and Receivers together in a competitive, inter-
active setting, and allows Receivers full access to both verbal and
non-verbal cues to deception. The key finding was that Receiver
accuracy and Sender detectability were reliably associated: better
lie detectors tended to be better deceivers, suggesting some under-
lying “deception-general” ability that transfers to both aspects of
deceptive engagements. Deception has been argued to be a diffi-
cult task to undertake successfully, but with the potential to confer
evolutionary advantage (Spence, 2004). As proposed by Serota
et al. (2010) and supported by evidence from this experiment,
a small percentage of individuals may have the skills necessary
to effect deception successfully, and to detect deception in their
interaction partners.
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